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11 June 1965

**DCI BRIEFING FOR
SENATOR STENNIS**

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

- I. In the Dominican Republic, there is no prospect in sight for a political compromise, and a military solution appears unlikely. The loyalist regime mounted a successful military drive in late May to clean out rebel pockets in the northern part of the capital, but this initiative came to an end when the troops reached the corridor stretching across the town from the international safety zone.
- A. Imbert has continued his attempt to mobilize mass support through rallies and demonstrations but has largely been unsuccessful. He has gained the support of some conservative parties and politicians who give a right-wing cast to his regime.

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
- B. In a sudden move to gain support, Imbert on June first offered to let the OAS set the date for elections that would be open to all non-extremist candidates, and supervised by the OAS. The rebels rejected the *INITIATIVE* as "another Imbert farce." Imbert later retreated from his proposal, saying that the "Caamano problem" must be solved before any solution can be found.
- C. Imbert appears to be under some pressure from his military leaders to avoid concessions to the rebels. They disapproved of his transfer of the National Palace to OAS control and may have been behind his refusal to allow the OAS to control Radio Santo Domingo. Some of the loyalist military commanders are probably toying with the idea of taking direct action against the rebels.
- II. The rebels appear to be increasingly tense as the stalemate continues. This is indicated by tightened security measures in the rebel sector of Santo Domingo, and by possible dissension between Caamano's Communist backers and his supporters in Juan Bosch's Dominican Revolutionary Party (PRD).

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
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- A. Caamaño appears to remain intransigent towards a political solution. He is demanding a five-point program as the basis for a settlement. These include: retention of the 1963 Bosch Constitution; maintenance of the Bosch-dominated Congress; incorporation of rebel military leaders into the military forces; a government of "Democratic personalities" (probably excluding Imbert); and the immediate departure of the interventionist forces. Imbert and his supporters find the first four of these points unacceptable.
- B. Communist influence among the rebels remains strong. They are particularly active in rebel paramilitary units and in propaganda activities. In fact, one adviser to the Communists recommended that they tone down their propaganda because its Communist origin was too obvious.
- C. The rebels have been increasingly their propaganda against the US, probably because they feel that the US is preventing a settlement favorable to them. The large (6-10,000) rebel rally last Saturday vociferously stressed an anti-US theme.



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III. Exiled President Juan Bosch has continued, from his haven in Puerto Rico, to guide rebel leaders and to boost the morale of rebel forces through recorded speeches urging the people to maintain the struggle. Bosch is also working to maintain the unity of his Dominican Revolutionary Party. He has ordered that the party's executive committee meet, but that all decisions must first be discussed with him.

- A. Bosch has advised the rebels to exploit the changes of loyalist atrocities. This theme is certain to receive much play by the rebels.
- B. He has also instructed the rebel leaders not to rush into negotiations. He says that the stalemate is not their problem but that of the US and OAS. In addition, perhaps to give heart to the rebels, Bosch had predicted that a "solution" will be reached in June even if there is no "agreement."

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V. The Latin American contingents in the Inter-American Peace Force are playing a more important role. They now patrol much of the International Security Zone. The Brazilian troops in particular seem to be very effective. There are now 1,200 Brazilians, 250 Hondurans, 160 Nicaraguans, 21 Costa Ricans and 3 El Salvadorans under the command of Brazilian General Hugo Panasco Alvin.

A. There have been sporadic outbreaks of violence in the Dominican interior. These have included attacks on police stations and army posts. There have also been demonstrations that have resulted in violence.

B. The outlook is for more violence. Monday, June 14, is the anniversary of the abortive 1959 Castro-backed invasion against Trujillo, from which the Fourteenth of June Political Group, a major supporter of Caamaño, takes its name. It is likely that they will attempt to celebrate with demonstrations throughout the country. This may result in violence as the loyalist military and police attempt to suppress them.

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**DCI BRIEFING FOR
SENATOR STENNIS**

BOLIVIA

- I. In Bolivia, the military junta had had some success this week in attempts to establish authority over the nationalized mines.
 - A. The attempt to bring the tin mines under control caused violent clashes in the latter part of May, but the government considers the issue so imperative that it is willing to use armed force if necessary.
 1. The miners, undisciplined and led by extremists, have resisted effective government authority ever since the revolution of 1952.
 2. The Bolivian government, however, now realizes that it cannot begin to cope with its economic problems before it establishes sound management of the nationalized mines.
 3. A program for reform and rehabilitation of the mines has been decreed, but cannot be implemented until the miners are brought under control and disarmed.

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B. The reform program has been accepted at some mines after a brief show of force, but a few mines, notably at Huanuni (WAH-HOO-NEE) and Colquiri, remain outside government control. Military occupation of these mines is imminent.

II. The power struggle between the co-presidents of the junta, Barrientos and Ovando, remains the most disturbing element in the political picture.

A. It stems from the ambitious character of the two generals. Each wants to be president, and both have significant military support, but only Barrientos has popular political support.

B. Since President Victor Paz Estenssoro was ousted last November, General Ovando has been conspiring secretly with extremists of both the right and left in an effort to line up enough political support of his own to topple General Barrientos.

C. Relations between the two men came dangerously close to the breaking point on May 24.

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1. At that time Barrientos, then sole head of the junta, had begun deporting the principal extreme leftists and was moving the army against the armed workers' militias and striking workers.
 2. Ovando, who was commander of the armed forces, signed a cease-fire pact with the workers without consulting the rest of the junta. The agreement in effect gave the workers almost everything they demanded, and would have denied the government the necessary means of controlling the mines.
- D. Barrientos moved Ovando up to the co-presidency and took over joint command of the armed forces, in order to keep an eye on him, to neutralize his power, and, most importantly, to maintain unity in the armed forces. A split in the military would probably have plunged the country into civil war, and still could. So far this maneuver by Barrientos has succeeded. Ovando is lying low, and unity of the armed forces has been preserved, but a final showdown between the two seems inevitable.

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**SCI BRIEFING FOR
SENATOR STENNIS**

MIDDLE EAST

- I. In the Middle East, factionalism and rivalry in the Arab camp have given rise to a new crop of coup rumors, just at the time when Israel is taking a harder line against border incursions and the Arab plans to divert Jordan waters.
 - A. Syria has been demanding a more aggressive Arab reaction to the Israelis. The May 31 speech by Egyptian President Nasser was a weak--but accurate--apology for the inability of the Arab camp to challenge the Israelis militarily at this time.

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C. Iraq itself is in poor position to take part in coups against another government. The pro-Egyptian and anti-Egyptian factions in Baghdad are at each other's throats again. President Arif who holds the shaky regime together is

25X1 [redacted] The costly military campaign against the Kurds is on again, with little promise of success.

1. Communist and Baathist elements in Iraq are talking about coup possibilities.
2. Moves toward unity with Egypt have antagonized those who oppose Nasir, while at the same time they have been so minimal that they have not satisfied those who demand union.

II. Arab terrorist raiding parties are striking into Israel from Lebanon and Jordan. The two governments are probably not directly involved, but have been unable to stop the raids and are afraid that they will either provoke Israeli reprisals or raise tension to such a pitch that they cannot successfully resist Syrian demands that stronger forces of the United Arab Command be stationed in Lebanon and Jordan.

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III. In Yemen, Egyptian troop strength has been increased steadily ever since October, 1962. It now amounts to some 50 to 55,000 men.

- A. Despite this heavy Egyptian commitment, there is a military stalemate with the royalists, who are supported by Saudi Arabia.
- B. The new head of the Yemeni republican government, Prime Minister Numan, has been urging the withdrawal of Egyptian troops. He feels that if the UAR presence were removed, he could find enough common ground with the Yemeni tribes and the Saudis to end the civil war.
- C. Nasir would certainly like to extricate himself from this mess. It is not only costly and showing no signs of success, but ties up about one third of his ground forces at a time when other Arabs are challenging him to take a more defiant posture against Israel.
 - 1. Nasir cannot afford to pull out of Yemen, however, unless he can leave a friendly republican government in reasonably secure control there. He sees no early prospect for such a solution, and without it, he would not only give up any influence in Yemen, but would lose considerable prestige in the Arab world.

11 June 1965

BACK-UP PAPER FOR
DCI'S BRIEFING OF
SENATOR STENNIS

VIETNAM STRENGTH FIGURES

REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM ARMED FORCES (RVNAF)

	<u>1 January 1965</u>	<u>Latest Available</u>
Regulars: Army	220,360	
Navy	8,194	
Marine	7,209	
Air	10,521	
	246,284	(breakdown not available)
		(audit 31 May)
Regional Force	98,049	255,129
Popular Force	168,317	(do) 105,172
Coastal Force	3,747	(do) 150,167
National Police	31,395	(estimate 15 May) 4,000
CIDG	21,454	(do) 37,800
		(do) 21,000
	567,246	573,268

(note: comparison of strength figures subject to firm audit--
regulars, Regional Force, Popular Force--shows drop
from 510,650 in January to 510,468 in June. Decline
is due to drop in Popular Force strength.)

PEOPLE'S ARMY OF VIETNAM (PAVN) (North Vietnamese) in South Vietnam:

Confirmed	0	400 (one battalion)
Possible	0	1,200 (one regiment)
Reported	0	3,600 to 4,500 (three reg'ts)

(note: MACV carries 2nd Bn, 101st Regt, 325th Div, confirmed.
One PAVN defector in Kontum Province early this year reported
all 3 bns of 101st in Kontum, and MACV carries as "possible"
1965 infiltration. Two defectors, latest in June, report all
three regiments of 325th in South Vietnam.)

Total estimated strength of North Vietnamese army was 226,000
on 1 January. 239,000 at present. Of these, we estimated that about
7,000 were in Laos on 1 January, and still carry the same figure
for the Laotian commitment.

	<u>1 Jan 65</u>	<u>Current</u>
VIET CONG forces:		
	(MACV	
Combat Regulars:	32,975 (19 Dec.	46,600 (*)
Non-Combat regulars:	(not carried)(update)	17,600
		64,200 (*)
Irregulars:	<u>60,000 - 80,000</u>	<u>91,755</u>
Total:	92,975 6112,975	155,955 (#)

(*—figures do not include 400 PAVN listed on previous page normally completing MACV's "Viet Cong Main Force" holding of 47,000 combat, 64,600 total.

This figure could include another estimated 30,000 armed Viet Cong whom we have omitted because their role is more political than military. They enter villages to conduct propaganda, collect taxes, etc.)

The increase in Viet Cong main force strength from January to the present reflects largely the re-evaluation of MACV and South Vietnamese Order-of-Battle holdings, rather than any major infiltration.

Unit breakdown of combat regulars:

Regimental Headquarters	5	9
Battalions	47	64 (incl. one PAVN)
Separate Companies	135	188
Separate platoons	29	114